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I. Introduction
It has been more than three decades since China started to transform its economy
institutionally and structurally. The economic transformation has stimulated rapid
economic growth in both GDP and personal incomes. From 1978 to 2007 the annual
growth of GDP averaged close to 10 percent and that of household per capita income
more than 7 percent. The rate of economic growth was even more impressive in later
years, including the period under study in this chapter.

From 2002 to 2007 annual

growth of GDP was 11.6 percent, and of rural and urban household income per capita
6.8 and 9.6 percent, respectively.1
Although the reforms were successful in promoting GDP growth, by the early
2000s concerns about rising disparities and sustainability prompted the government to
announce a new development strategy emphasizing sustainable, harmonious growth.
A new policy program, referred to as the “vision of scientific development” (kexue
fazhanguan), or “the Hu-Wen new policies” (Hu-Wen xin zheng), aimed to promote
development in urban and rural areas, reduce regional disparities, narrow income
inequalities, and establish a social protection network with full coverage for all people.
As discussed in Chapters 1 and 5, the new policy program contained a series of
pro-rural measures. These included the elimination of the agricultural taxes, which
had been in place for almost sixty years, and the adoption of new farm subsidies, e.g.,
for grain production, purchase of agricultural inputs, and farm insurance (Lin and
Wong 2012).2 By the end of 2007 Chinese rural households were no longer paying
agricultural taxes, and total agricultural production subsidies from the central
government exceeded 50 billion yuan (Ministry of Agriculture 2007; Lin and Wong
2012).
87

The pro-rural policies also addressed social welfare concerns. In the early 2000s
the government initiated programs that reduced the costs of education in poor areas,
and in 2006-7 the central government announced a policy of free education in rural
areas through junior middle school, eliminating all fees for the first nine years of
education (see Chapter 4).

During the same time frame, subsidized rural cooperative

health care and a rural medical care relief fund were put in place. Although these
measures did not have an immediate impact on household earnings, they reduced
household outlays on education and health and encouraged schooling, which in the
long term can enhance incomes.
The rural minimum living guarantee (zuidi shenghuo baozheng, or dibao)
program was another important component of the rural policy program.

The number

of rural people supported by dibao increased enormously, from 4 million in 2002 to
36 million in 2007. On average, in 2007 each individual received about 480 yuan,
equivalent to 60 percent of the official poverty line in rural areas (Ministry of Civil
Affairs 2007; see Chapters 1 and 5).
During this period the Chinese government also maintained or expanded policies
benefiting lower-income urban households, such as the urban dibao program and the
provision of low-cost housing.

Some steps were also taken to improve the situation

of poor rural-to-urban migrants, e.g., regulations issued in 2003 regarding the
treatment of vagrants and beggars, which provided social services to poor individuals
regardless of their place of origin (Li 2004; State Council 2003).

The impact of such

programs on urban inequality, however, has been mixed. Analyses of the urban
dibao program, for example, reveal that it played an important role in alleviating
urban poverty, but did not substantially reduce urban income inequality (Li and Yang
2009; Ravallion et al. 2006).

Moreover, the number of urban households benefiting
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from the program did not increase significantly during the period under study here.
China’s economic growth is closely related to urbanization. The share of the
urban population in China’s total population has increased almost one percentage
point each year since 1990. By the end of 2007, the share of the urban population in
the total population was 45 percent. Rural-to-urban migration has been an important
part of the urbanization process. According to the Second National Agricultural
Census, in 2006 the number of rural-urban migrant workers who were employed in
urban areas for more than six months per year was about 132 million. Although rural
migration can contribute to the growth of household income in rural areas, it can also
create competition in urban labor markets that potentially affects urban incomes and
inequality as well.
In China rural-urban and regional divisions in terms of economic and social
development are substantial. These spatial divisions were significant during the
planning period (Démurger et al. 2002) and have persisted into the reform era.
Concerns about the urban-rural income gap prompted many of the rural support
policies outlined above. Similarly, differential economic growth between coastal and
inland regions led the Chinese government to adopt regional balancing policies. In
1999 the central government implemented the western development strategy (xibu
dakaifa zhanlüe) and increased investment in infrastructure and fiscal transfers to
western provinces (Fang, Zhang, and Li 2007). This was followed by further
programs supporting other lagging regions, such as the revival the Northeast strategy
(zhenxing dongbei) in 2003 and the rise of the central region (zhongbu jueqi) scheme
aimed at the central provinces in 2006 (Yao 2009; Chung, Lai, and Joo 2009).
policies could have an impact on regional income disparities.
Using data from the 2002 and 2007 waves of the China Household Income
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Such

Project (CHIP) survey, in this chapter we measure and analyze income inequality and
poverty during the 2002-2007 period.

Here we report overall nationwide patterns

and trends. The findings reported in this chapter establish the groundwork for the
later chapters in this volume, which provide in-depth analyses of particular sectors,
programs and policies.
We begin in the next section with a brief review of the main findings in the recent
literature on changes in China’s income inequality and summarize the results from the
previous volume based on the 2002 CHIP survey (Gustafsson, Li, and Sicular 2008).
In Section III we explain key features of our data.

In Section IV we present our

central findings regarding levels and trends in China’s national income inequality, and
we also examine the sources of income.

Despite substantial growth in mean incomes

between 2002 and 2007, and despite the various policies adopted to promote
harmonious growth, during this period nationwide inequality continued an upward
trend.

This conclusion is robust to choice of income definition, weights, and

inequality index, and to the treatment of migrants.
A growing number of rural people have moved to the cities, but they are not fully
captured in the official National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) household surveys.

This

leads to a potential bias in estimations of income growth and inequality among
Chinese households. Other chapters in this volume examine the income and inequality
of the rural and formal urban populations, but not that of rural-urban migrants.
Therefore, in this chapter we include a separate section on income and inequality
among rural-urban migrants.

Following the method used by the NBS to identify the

location of residence, we define migrants as those individuals who have a rural
household registration but who reside in a city on a long-term, stable basis.
Short-term, temporary migrants are treated as members of their rural households of
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origin and are included in the rural survey dataset (see further discussion in Chapter 1
and Appendix II).
Our analysis shows that between 2002 and 2007 the incomes of long-term, stable
rural-urban migrants grew rapidly, and inequality among migrants declined.
Including migrants in our calculations of inequality reduces inequality within the
urban areas, but due to the relatively low share of this group in the national population,
it does not substantially alter the national levels of inequality. Temporary and
short-term migration, however, contributed to income growth of rural households and
thus likely moderated the income gap between the urban and rural areas (see also
Chapter 6 in this volume).
The increase in China’s national inequality between 2002 and 2007 reflects
changes in the spatial structure of China’s income distribution, as discussed in
Sections VI and VII.

The continued widening of the urban-rural income gap is of

particular concern because the urban-rural divide remains a major source of inequality.
Analysis of inequality among geographic regions reveals that regional income
differentials in fact contribute a relatively small share of national inequality.

The

overwhelming majority of national inequality is associated with inequality within
regions, including urban-rural gaps within regions.
Finally, in Section VIII we examine nationwide trends in poverty (later chapters
in this volume will examine rural and urban poverty separately).

Between 2002 and

2007 national poverty, as measured using an absolute poverty line, continued an
ongoing decline and reached historically low levels. Relative poverty, however,
remained unchanged. We comment on these and other findings in a concluding
section.
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II.

Main Findings of Previous Studies

The rise in income inequality in China during the reform era has been widely
documented.

Past studies have found that nationwide inequality rose rapidly

between the late 1980s and the mid-1990s but then tapered off from the mid-1990s
through the early 2000s. Estimates by Ravallion and Chen (2007) and the World
Bank (2009a) show income inequality rising from the late 1980s through 1994,
dipping a bit in the late 1990s, and then edging upward thereafter, so that by the early
2000s inequality was only slightly higher than it was in the mid-1990s. Analyses
based on the 1995 and 2002 CHIP surveys similarly report that inequality remained
more or less unchanged between 1995 and 2002 (Gustafsson, Li, and Sicular 2008a;
Khan and Riskin 2008).
Gustafsson, Li, and Sicular (2008a) identify several equalizing processes that
emerged in the late 1990s that might explain these trends.

They include the spread

of wage employment in the rural areas, the catching up of lower-income provinces
with higher-income provinces in some regions, shared macroeconomic growth, and,
within urban areas, broader implementation of the urban housing reforms.
The emergence of equalizing processes from the late 1990s to the early 2000s
raises the possibility that inequality in China may have turned the corner. Findings
based on the 2007 CHIP data reported below, however, show that after 2002
inequality in China resumed its upward trajectory.

The analysis in this and later

chapters finds evidence that some equalizing processes continued to operate during
this period, but they were insufficient to offset the stronger dis-equalizing forces.
Spatial income differentials figure large in the literature on inequality in China.
The widening gap between urban and rural incomes is consistently cited as an
important factor underlying national inequality (e.g., Sicular et al. 2010; Ravallion
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and Chen 2007; World Bank 2009a; Kanbur and Zhang 2009).

This finding is robust

across numerous studies using different measures of income and inequality.
Regional income differences between the eastern, central, and western regions have
also received attention, although several recent studies conclude that regional
differences are not as important as within-region and rural-urban inequality (Yao 2009;
Fan, Kanbur, and Zhang 2010; Wan 2007).

Below we explore rural-urban and

regional income differentials using the 2007 CHIP data; our findings are generally
consistent with these other studies.
China has an enviable record of poverty reduction (World Bank 2009a; Ravallion
and Chen 2007; Chen and Ravallion 2008).

Although various studies differ in their

choices of poverty measures and poverty lines, they agree on broad trends over time.
During the early and mid-1990s poverty in China declined substantially, but then in
the late 1990s to the early 2000s the downward trend stalled (World Bank 2009a;
Ravallion and Chen 2007; Minoiu and Reddy 2008). Some recent studies suggest that
after 2001 poverty reduction once again accelerated (World Bank 2009a).

Our

estimates of absolute poverty show progress in terms of poverty reduction from 2002
through 2007.
Most of the literature on poverty in China measures poverty using an absolute
poverty line based on the cost of basic food and non-food consumption needs.

As

countries develop, deprivation is associated more with relative than with absolute
living standards.

In view of China’s transformation from a low- to a middle-income

country, we extend the analysis of poverty and measure relative poverty. By such a
measure, China’s poverty record in recent years is less encouraging.
Poverty, like inequality, has spatial dimensions: it is primarily rural, and its
incidence is higher in western China than elsewhere (World Bank 2009a; Ravallion
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and Chen 2007).

As the overall level of poverty has declined, however, the

remaining poor have become increasingly dispersed.

The spatial pattern of poverty

is important in terms of the design of poverty alleviation programs, which in China
have relied heavily on geographic targeting (World Bank 2009a).

Therefore, in the

analysis below we also investigate the regional aspects of poverty.

III.

Data and Sample Weights

The data used in this chapter come from the last two waves of the CHIP household
surveys, in 2002 and 2007. The surveys cover three types of households: urban
households, rural households, and rural-urban migrant households. The samples of
urban households and rural households are subsamples of the large NBS urban and
rural household survey samples. In 2002, the NBS samples included 680,000
households in rural areas and 40,000 households in urban areas.3 In 2007, the urban
sample increased to 59,000 households, but the size of the rural sample remained
more or less unchanged.4
The 2002 wave of the CHIP rural survey selected 9,200 households from the
NBS rural household survey. These households contain 37,969 individuals from 120
counties of twenty-two provinces. Provinces covered by the CHIP sample were
selected so as to obtain representation of China’s major regions.

For the rural

sample, the provinces include Beijing (representing the large metropolitan cities with
provincial administrative status); Hebei, Liaoning, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Shandong, and
Guangdong (representing the eastern region); Shanxi, Jilin, Anhui, Jiangxi, Henan,
Hubei, and Hunan (representing the central region); and Chongqing, Sichuan,
Guizhou, Yunnan, Guangxi, Shaanxi, Xinjiang, and Gansu (representing the western
region).5 The provincial statistical bureaus were given autonomy to decide the
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number of counties in the CHIP subsample, but they were required to select counties
and villages representative of different income levels. The 2002 urban survey selected
6,835 households. These households contain 20,632 individuals surveyed in seventy
cities in eleven of the twenty-two provinces of the rural survey, including Beijing
(large municipality); Liaoning, Jiangsu, Guangdong (eastern); Shanxi, Anhui, Henan,
Hubei (central); and Chongqing, Sichuan, Yunnan, and Gansu (western). These
households are largely formal urban residents with local household registration
(hukou).

A detailed description of the 2002 survey can be found in Li et al. (2008).

The 2002 rural and urban household questionnaires were designed for the purpose
of deriving household income that could be comparable internationally. The
households were asked questions regarding wage and other income components for
each of their working members, and regarding income from family businesses. In
order to estimate the imputed rent of owner-occupied private housing, several
housing-related questions were included, such as the self-estimated market value and
the market rent of owner-occupied housing.
The 2002 CHIP survey also included a separate, add-on sample of 2,000
rural-urban migrant households, which were selected from the capital city plus one
middle-sized city in each province that is represented in the CHIP urban survey. Two
hundred households were selected from each of the provinces in the eastern and
central regions and 150 households from each of the provinces in the western region.
Within each province, 100 households were allocated to the capital city and the
remainder to other cities. Within the cities, rural-urban migrant households were
selected from residential communities, hence the migrant workers living in
construction sites and factories were excluded from the sample. Since in our analyses
we only use the subsample of migrants who are long-term, stable residents of cities,
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this aspect of the 2002 sample selection is not overly problematic. The migrant
questionnaires include questions regarding wage, business income, consumption, and
job characteristics of individual members and households.
The 2007 CHIP surveys of rural and urban households were conducted in sixteen
provinces, including Beijing, and Shanghai (representing the large metropolitan cities
with provincial administrative status); Fujian, Guangdong, Liaoning, Jiangsu, and
Zhejiang (eastern); Anhui, Hebei, Henan, Hubei, and Shanxi (central); and Chongqing,
Sichuan, Yunnan, and Gansu (western). The survey of rural-urban migrant households
covered nine of the above sixteen provinces. The CHIP surveys cover 13,000 rural
households, 10,000 urban local households, and 5,000 rural-urban migrant households.
As in the 2002 surveys, the 2007 surveys of rural households and urban local
households took subsamples from the large NBS sample, whereas the rural-urban
migrant survey was conducted separately. For the 2007 migrant survey, sampling was
carried out using a geographical grid.

Cells from the grid were chosen randomly;

within each selected cell, the survey team identified all employers and workplaces and
drew up a list of all their migrant employees. Migrants were then selected randomly
from this list of employees.

The CHIP migrant survey sample is composed of the

selected migrants and their household members. This approach is different from that
used to construct the 2002 migrant sample.

The change in the sampling method for

migrants may affect comparisons across the two years; however, to some extent the
consequences are mitigated by the fact that in our analysis we only include those
migrants who are long-term, stable residents, and also by the use of population
weights when incorporating the migrant subsamples into our urban and national
calculations. More details about the 2007 survey are provided in Chapter 1 and
Appendix I of this volume.
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The questionnaires for the 2007 surveys include many but not all of the same
questions as the 2002 surveys. However, new questions regarding migration status
and behavior were added for the purpose of migration analysis.
The CHIP survey samples have several characteristics that may lead to an
estimation bias if the samples are used without population-based sample weights.

A

detailed discussion of weights can be found in Appendix II of this volume and in Li et
al. (2008). The key issues are (a) the CHIP sample was designed to be representative
of four distinct regions (large municipalities with provincial status, eastern China,
central China, and western China),6 (b) not all provinces are included in the samples,
and provincial coverage changed between 2002 and 2007, (c) provincial sample sizes
are not proportional to their populations, and (d) the urban, rural, and migrant sample
sizes are not proportional to their populations. In view of these features, when
subsamples are combined among groups and regions, and for comparison over time,
population weights are needed to make the samples representative and comparable
across years.
As discussed in Appendix II of this volume, two alternative approaches are
recommended for sample weights. The first is to use two-level weights based on the
population shares of each group (urban, rural, and where relevant migrant) within
each region. The second is to use three-level weights based on the population shares
of each group (urban, rural, and where relevant migrant) within each province and
region.

In general, we use three-level weights, but to show the sensitivity of the

estimation results to the weighting methods, in Table 2A.1 we present estimates of
national incomes and inequality calculated using alternative weights.
With respect to income, our preferred measure is net disposable household per
capita income.

The NBS calculates an estimate of net disposable household income
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that is published in the official sources and is provided in the CHIP datasets.

As

discussed elsewhere (Gustafsson, Li, and Sicular 2008a; Khan and Riskin 1998), the
NBS calculation of net disposable income omits certain components of income.

For

this reason, we prefer an alternative calculation of income based on that outlined in
Khan et al. (1992) and Khan and Riskin (1998), but adapted in light of recent shifts in
the structure of income and data availability.

Specifically, we calculate income as

NBS income, plus imputed subsidies on subsidized rental housing, plus the imputed
value of rental income on owner-occupied housing.

The CHIP surveys contain

information on estimated market rents and market housing values that are used to
calculate these additional income components.

For imputed rental income of

owner-occupied housing, we use the estimates explained in Chapter 3 of this volume.7
Below we refer to this alternative, broader measure of income as “CHIP income.”
For purposes of comparison over time, we deflate the 2007 incomes using the
consumer price indexes published by the NBS to obtain values in constant 2002 prices.
For national calculations, we use the average national consumer price index.

For

separate analyses of the urban and rural areas, we use the separate urban and rural
consumer price indexes (the urban consumer price index is used for rural-urban
migrants). Between 2002 and 2007 the consumer price indexes show that on
average nationwide consumer prices rose by 13.9 percent; in the urban areas
consumer prices rose by 12.3 percent and in the rural areas by 16.4 percent.8
Several studies note that differences in costs of living among regions and
provinces can lead to an overstatement of real inequality (Brandt and Holz 2006;
Sicular et al. 2010).

To obtain income that is comparable among regions in terms of

purchasing power parity (PPP), we use the PPP-adjusted deflator from Brandt and
Holz (2006) to correct for differences in living costs between urban and rural areas
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and among provinces. Brandt and Holz (2006) provide the PPP deflators for 2002
that we apply to the 2002 CHIP data.

For 2007 we update the Brandt and Holz PPP

deflators using the official consumer price indexes for urban and rural areas by
province, as published by the NBS.

IV. National Household Income Inequality: Main Findings
Table 2.1 shows mean national household per capita income and income inequality
calculated using three commonly used inequality indices, the Gini coefficient and two
Theil indices.

Although less common than the Gini, the Theil indices have desirable

properties and, unlike the Gini, can be decomposed to analyze inequality between and
within groups, which is useful for us to examine the role of urban-rural inequality.9
We also show the Lorenz curve, which gives a graphical depiction of inequality and is
closely related to the Gini.10
Our preferred estimates are calculated using the CHIP definition of income,
including migrants, and with three-level population weights (urban/rural/migrant
group x region x province).

As our preferences may not be universally shared, and

for ease of comparison with other studies, we also present estimates calculated using
the NBS definition of income, and excluding migrants. Appendix Table 2A.1 gives
estimates calculated using alternative weighting methods, and Appendix Table 2A.2
gives estimates calculated using alternative estimates of imputed rents on
owner-occupied housing.
Table 2.1 about here
On average, incomes increased markedly between 2002 and 2007.

Regardless

of the income definition, treatment of migrants, or choice of weights, mean income
increased more than 70 percent during the five years (calculated using constant 2002
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prices), implying an average annual growth in income of 12 to 13 percent.

Income

growth was more rapid for the CHIP definition of income than for the NBS definition,
reflecting growth in imputed rents on owner-occupied housing and the expansion of
urban homeownership, as discussed in Chapter 3 of this volume. The inclusion of
migrants modestly increases the mean income levels in 2007, and yields more rapid
growth in income.
On balance, growth in mean income should reduce inequality: if mean income
increases while the distribution of income around the mean stays unchanged, then
measured inequality will decline.

Despite the substantial growth in national mean

income, however, inequality in China increased.
From 2002 to 2007 China’s Gini coefficient rose by 5.0 to 5.5 percent.

For our

preferred calculation (CHIP income, including migrants), the Gini rose by 5.0 percent,
from 0.46 in 2002 to 0.48 in 2007.

This level of inequality is moderately high by

international standards.
Increases in the Theil measures of inequality were larger, ranging from 9.5
percent for G(1) to nearly 14.6 percent for G(0).

Differences in inequality trends

among the three measures reflect that each measure emphasizes different sections of
the income distribution.

The Gini emphasizes income differences in the middle of

the distribution, the GE(0) places more weight on income differences in the lower tail
of the distribution, and the GE(1) places even weight on income differences across the
income distribution.
A graph of the Lorenz curves reveals the pattern of change in income distribution
that underlies the increases in these inequality indices (Figure 2.1).

The Lorenz

curve for 2007 is everywhere lower than that for 2002, which is consistent with an
increase in inequality as measured by the inequality indices in Table 2.1.
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Figure 2.1 about here
Figure 2.2 shows the distribution of income across income decile groups, ordered
from the poorest 10 percent to the richest 10 percent.

The height of the light grey

bars gives mean income by decile in 2002, and the height of the dark grey bars gives
mean income by decile in 2007 (in constant 2002 prices). The black line shows the
percentage increase in income between 2002 and 2007 (in constant prices) for each
decile.
Figure 2.2 about there
It is clear from Figure 2.2 that income increased for all decile groups, but the
increase was smaller for the poorer deciles than for the richer deciles. The income of
the bottom decile increased by 401 yuan, or 45 percent (in constant 2002 prices).
This is a substantial increase, but in both absolute and relative terms it lags far behind
that of the higher income groups.

The income of the top decile, for example,

increased by more than 14,000 yuan, or 86 percent.
Do these patterns of inequality reflect changes in the composition of income?
Clues about the role of different income sources can be found in Table 2.2, which
shows the income shares, Gini concentration ratios, and contributions to overall
inequality of each component of per capita income.

The contributions to inequality

are calculated using the standard inequality decomposition by factor components
(Shorrocks 1982).
Table 2.2 about here
Looking first at urban incomes, one can see that the concentration ratio of urban
household incomes is much higher than the Gini of the total income distribution,
implying that on balance urban income was concentrated among higher-income
groups. This was especially true for urban income from assets and imputed rent on
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owner-occupied housing.

More generally, the numbers in Table 2.2 reveal the

emergence of private property as a new and increasingly important source of
inequality. Nationally, including both rural and migrant households, the contribution
of assets and imputed rent to total inequality rose from 8 percent in 2002 to 13 percent
in 2007.

If calculated using alternative estimates of imputed rent, the contribution of

assets and imputed rent to total inequality rose from 10 to 19 percent.11
The negative contribution of urban net transfers (including both government and
private transfers) is also noteworthy, especially in 2007 when they reduced total
inequality by 5 percent.

The increasingly equalizing role of urban net transfers

likely reflects the expansion of government urban welfare programs, such as the urban
minimum living guarantee program (see Chapter 7) and income taxes (see Chapters 7
and 10).
The concentration coefficient of migrant income was similar to that of urban
income, but owing to the small population and income share of migrants, the overall
impact on national inequality remained small, although it increased over time.

In

Section V we discuss the income and inequality of migrants in more detail.
In contrast, the concentration ratio of rural household income was close to zero in
2002 and became negative in 2007, implying that rural household income had an
increasingly equalizing effect on total inequality. Income from farming was the most
equalizing source of rural income.

Income from short-term migrant work by rural

household members was also equalizing, and became more equalizing from 2002 to
2007.

In-depth analysis of rural incomes and inequality can be found in Chapter 6 in

this volume.
Most analyses of inequality in China do not adjust for differences in the cost of
living among regions. The cost of living is typically higher in wealthier areas,
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therefore measured inequality will be overstated as it reflects price differentials as
well as real differences in purchasing power.

Table 2.3 presents a comparison of

inequality estimates calculated with and without adjustments for PPP.
PPP adjustments reduce the measured level of inequality.

In all cases,

For example, adjusting for

PPP reduces the 2007 Gini coefficient by 12 percent, from 0.483 to 0.423.
Table 2.3 about here
Although the measured level of inequality is lower with the PPP adjustment, it
remains moderately high compared to inequality estimates for other countries (which
typically are not adjusted for domestic price differentials). The 2007 Gini coefficient,
for example, remains well above 0.40 regardless of whether it is calculated using NBS
or CHIP income.

Moreover, PPP adjustments do not alter the conclusion that

inequality rose substantially between 2002 and 2007. In fact, the increase in PPP
inequality is 8 percent, which is greater than the 5 percent increase for our non-PPP
estimates.

V.

Household Income Growth and Inequality of Rural-Urban Migrants

Because other chapters in this volume do not fully explore incomes and inequality
among rural-urban migrants, here we include a separate analysis of incomes and
inequality for this group.

Our analysis draws on data from the CHIP migrant surveys

carried out in 2002 and 2007.

As mentioned earlier, in our analysis we include only

long-term, stable rural-urban migrants. Following the criteria used to classify
individuals in the NBS household surveys (on which the CHIP surveys are based), we
define long-term, stable rural-urban migrants as individuals whose origins are in rural
areas, who have lived in cities for more than six months, and who are either single or
living with a spouse.

A detailed explanation of the classification criteria can be
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found in Appendix II to this volume.
We note that limiting our analysis to long-term, stable migrants reduces the
potential bias due to differences in the sampling methods used for the 2002 and 2007
migrant surveys.

As noted above, the 2002 survey does not capture migrants who

live in temporary or employer-provided housing. This group is largely composed of
short-term, temporary migrants, whom we exclude from our long-term, stable migrant
sample (but who are represented in the rural sample).
Table 2.4 shows the level and composition of per capita household income of
migrants.

The mean income of the migrants falls between that of rural and urban

households.

On average, in 2002 migrant income was 2.6 times rural per capita

income and 80 percent of urban per capita income.

In 2007 migrant per capita

income was 3.6 times rural per capita income and 95 percent of urban per capita
income.

Migrants enjoyed rapid income growth between 2002 and 2007. On

average, migrant per capita income in real terms grew at an annual rate of 16 percent,
exceeding the growth rates of both rural and urban incomes.

Thus, between 2002

and 2007 migrant income moved closer to that of urban households.

To some extent,

the higher migrant income growth rate may be due to a self-selection process.

It is

more likely that low-income migrants choose to return to their original homes,
whereas high-income migrants choose to remain in the cities on a more long-term and
stable basis.
Table 2.4 about here
Looking at the growth by income component, we find that the wage income of
migrants grew at a very rapid annual rate of 29 percent, so that its share of total
migrant income rose from 39 percent in 2002 to 68 percent in 2007.

As shown in

Table 2.4, almost 90 percent of the total income growth can be attributed to the
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growth of wage income. Growth of income from household businesses was slow, less
than 2 percent annually. The rapid growth of wage income and slow growth of
family business income shown here to some extent may be due to the change in the
migrant survey sampling procedure in the two years.

In 2002 the survey was

conducted in neighborhood communities (shequ) and did not include any migrant
workers living in construction sites or factory dormitories; in 2007 migrants were
selected based on employer records of migrant employees. This could lead to an
underrepresentation of wage employees and an overrepresentation of self-employed
migrants in 2002 as compared to 2007.

Nevertheless, as discussed in Chapter 6 in

this volume, rapid growth in migrant wage income at this time likely also reflected
real economic factors, in particular, growth in labor demand and increased reservation
wages associated with higher farm earnings.
Due to the increase in the wage share, which is relatively equally distributed, as
well as growth in incomes overall, income inequality for migrants declined from 2002
to 2007, as shown by the Lorenz curves in Figure 2.3 and the inequality indices and
inequality decomposition reported in Tables 2.5 and 2.6. Again, changes between
2002 and 2007 may in part reflect differences in the sampling procedures.12
Figure 2.3 about here
Table 2.5 about here
Table 2.6 about here
How does the inclusion of long-term, stable rural-urban migrants affect national
inequality?

As shown in Table 2.1, the inclusion of these migrants reduces national

inequality only slightly, by less than 1 percent in both years. Including migrants
reduces national inequality because they tend to fall at the center of the income
distribution, but the reduction is minimal because the population share of long-term,
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stable migrants is relatively small, although increasing.

According to data from the

2000 census, this group constituted 2.5 percent of the national population and 7.4
percent of the urban population.

According to data from the 2005 mini census, this

group constituted 3.2 percent of the national population and 7.6 percent of the urban
population (see Appendix II in this volume).
If we limit our attention to the urban sector, within which the migrants constitute
a larger share of the population, the inclusion of long-term, stable migrants when
estimating inequality has a greater impact (Table 2.7).

In 2002 the inclusion of

migrants reduced urban inequality by 8 percent, and in 2007 by 7 percent.
Table 2.7 about here
We note that the difference between inequality calculated with and without
migrants is not the same as measuring the full impact of migration on inequality.
Migration can influence income levels of urban and rural households, and likely has
different impacts in richer and poorer areas.

Fully analyzing the impact of migration

would require estimating the counterfactual income levels that would have prevailed
had migration not taken place.

Our calculations use only the actual income levels.

VI. The Structure of Inequality: The Urban-Rural Income Gap
Analyses of inequality in China typically highlight the widening gap between urban
and rural household incomes. Most studies, including those based on earlier rounds
of the CHIP survey, find that the urban-rural income gap has widened over time and
that it has contributed to the increase in overall inequality.
Here we examine changes in the urban-rural income gap between 2002 and 2007.
In our analysis we use the NBS and CHIP definitions of income.

We note that these

measures of income do not fully capture implicit subsidies that are disproportionately
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enjoyed by urban residents, and which if included would widen the urban-rural
differential (Li and Luo 2010).

We do, however, show estimates adjusted for cost of

living differences between the urban and rural areas, the correction of which should
reduce the urban-rural gap (Sicular et al. 2010).

We measure the urban-rural income

gap as the ratio of average disposable income per capita of households in the urban
survey, or in the combined urban and migrant surveys, to average net income per
capita of households in the rural survey.
We find that the urban-rural income gap continued to widen between 2002 and
2007 (Table 2.8).

The widening gap is not due to slow growth in rural

incomes—rural incomes in fact grew rapidly during this period (see Chapter 5)—but
reflects even faster growth in urban incomes. Calculated using CHIP income and
including migrants, the gap increases by about 20 percent from 3.2 to 3.8.
Table 2.8 about here
This urban-rural gap is high by international standards.

Available estimates for

other countries indicate that urban-rural income ratios above 3.0 are rare. For India,
Bangladesh, Indonesia, and Malaysia the ratio is less than 2.0; for Thailand and the
Philippines the ratio is 2.2-2.3.

Only for a few countries, such as South Africa and

Zimbabwe, does the ratio exceed 3.0 (Knight and Song 1999, p. 138; see also World
Bank 2009b).
Alternative calculations change the size of the gap, but in all cases the gap widens
from 2002 to 2007.

Excluding migrants increases the size of the income gap

somewhat but does not substantially change the trend. The income gap is smaller for
NBS income than for CHIP income, but in both cases the gap widens over time.
Adjusting for cost of living differences substantially reduces the magnitude of the
urban-rural income gap.

Measured using the CHIP PPP-adjusted incomes and
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including migrants, in 2002 the urban-rural income ratio is 2.2 and in 2007 2.7.
Again, the urban-rural income ratio widened, increasing by 24 percent between the
two years.
The widening urban-rural gap was a factor underlying rising national inequality.
Table 2.9 presents summary results of a standard inequality decomposition by
population subgroup using the Theil inequality measures (Shorrocks 1980).13

This

method disaggregates overall inequality into the contributions of inequality between
groups and within groups.

In our application, the groups are urban and rural.

Between-group inequality is the component associated with the urban-rural income
gap.
Table 2.9 about here
We report the results for the two Theil measures of inequality, for both the NBS
and CHIP income definitions, and without and with migrants.14

In all cases, the

share of national inequality contributed by between-group inequality increased from
2002 to 2007.

In 2002 between-group inequality contributed 43 to 46 percent of

overall inequality.

In 2007 between-group inequality contributed 48 to 52 percent of

overall inequality, an increase of about 5 percentage points over 2002. Thus, by
2007 the urban-rural income gap was associated with roughly half of the national
inequality in China.
PPP adjustments reduce the contribution of the urban-rural gap to inequality, but
exacerbate the increase in the contribution of the urban-rural gap to inequality over
time (Table 2.10).

For the CHIP measure of income and including migrants, in 2002

the urban-rural gap contributed 27 to 28 percent of PPP inequality, and by 2007 it had
risen to about more than 37 percent.
Table 2.10 about here
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VII. The Structure of Inequality: Regional Income Differences
Previous studies note large regional disparities in household incomes in China.
Analysis of the 2002 CHIP data identified large regional gaps, but with some evidence
of a regional catch-up (Gustafsson, Li, and Sicular 2008).

To investigate regional

income inequalities between 2002 and 2007, we conduct several computations.
Following the CHIP sampling approach as well as the official classification of regions,
in these computations we divide China into four regions: large, provincial-level
metropolitan cities; the eastern region; the central region; and the western region.
Table 2.11 shows the relative incomes of the four regions, calculated as a ratio
using the mean income of the western region as the denominator.

All calculations

use the CHIP income definition (see Appendix Table 2A.3 for mean incomes per
capita by region).
Table 2.11 about here
We present alternative estimates using unadjusted prices (current year prices, no
adjustments for regional cost of living differences) and PPP prices (current year prices,
adjusted for regional cost of living differences). Costs of living are generally higher
in more developed regions, so using the PPP prices reduces the income differences
between the richer and poorer regions. As shown in Table 2.11, PPP adjustments
markedly reduce regional income ratios between the large municipalities and the
western regions and between the eastern and western regions, but they do not
substantially change the income ratio between the central and western regions.
Looking at the PPP estimates, we find the largest income ratio to be between the
large municipalities and the western region. In 2002 per capita incomes in the large
municipalities were on average 2.5 times those in the western region; in 2007 the ratio
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narrowed slightly to 2.4. The ratio between the eastern and western regions was
smaller but also substantial; that between the central and western regions was fairly
small.

The regional structure of PPP incomes differs somewhat for the urban,

migrant, and rural subpopulations. Regional income differences are largest for rural
residents. With the exception of large municipalities, rural regional income
differences narrowed between 2002 and 2007.

The narrowing of rural regional

income differences might reflect the equalizing effects of migration, or the effects of
increased returns to farming (see Chapter 5), which could narrow the gap between
areas with more and less nonagricultural development.
In urban areas, the regional income gaps all widened. Our estimates indicate that
income growth of urban households in the western provinces lagged behind that of
urban households in other regions during the period under study.
differences among urban-based migrant households are small.

Regional income

Even between the

large metropolitan cities and the western region, in 2007 the income gap is less than 5
percent.

There is almost no regional income gap between the eastern and western

regions, and migrant incomes in central China are 6 percent lower than those in
western China.

The lack of substantial regional income differences for migrant

households may reflect the equalizing effect of migration among regions as migrants
move in response to real differentials in their wages.
Overall, then, it appears that the widening of the overall regional income gaps in
China between 2002 and 2007 was largely driven by regional trends among urban
areas, and between the large municipalities and the rest of China.

Income gaps

among other regions and groups were relatively stable or narrowed.
How important is interregional inequality to overall inequality in China?

We

address this question using standard inequality decomposition analysis of the Theil
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inequality indices by population subgroup.
regions.

Here the relevant groups are the four

The contribution of between-group inequality captures the importance of

regional income differences to overall inequality in China.
Table 2.12 about here
Table 2.12 shows estimates of the contribution of between-group (inter-region)
inequality to inequality for China as a whole (“all”) and for the urban, rural, and
migrant populations.

The table reports estimates calculated with and without PPP

adjustments, but our discussion focuses on the PPP estimates, for which incomes are
more comparable among regions and between urban and rural areas.
For China as a whole, the share of between-region inequality is relatively low,
contributing 11 to 12 percent of overall inequality, and with a very slight decrease
between 2002 and 2007.

In other words, in both years within-region inequality

accounts for the overwhelming majority of national inequality.
As one might expect, regional income differences are most important for rural
inequality, although over time their contribution declined.

In 2002 between-region

inequality contributed 19 percent and in 2007 less than 14 percent of rural inequality.
The declining contribution of regional income differentials to rural inequality likely
reflects the spread of nonagricultural employment opportunities from the eastern areas
to the central and western areas, as well as the increased migration by rural workers in
the western region.
For the formal urban population, between-region differences contributed a
smaller but growing share of inequality.

These results could reflect continuing or

perhaps increasing segmentation of the formal urban labor markets, as well as
regional immobility caused by rapidly rising housing costs in the large metropolitan
cities.
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Regional inequality is unimportant among migrant households.

As shown in

Table 2.12, between-region income inequality as a percentage of total inequality
among migrants was only about 1 percent in both years.
The findings in Table 2.12 indicate that national inequality is driven more by
inequality within regions than by inequality between regions.

Table 2.13, which

shows the levels of inequality within regions, reveals that within-region inequality has
remained particularly high in western China.

Within-region inequality increased in

eastern and central China between 2002 and 2007, but the increase was most
marked—more than 13 percent—in eastern China.
Table 2.13 about here
Inequality within regions is in part a reflection of the large urban-rural income
gap discussed in the previous section. In both 2002 and 2007 the urban-rural income
gap was largest in the western region, about 3 with the PPP adjustments (3.7 to 3.9
without the PPP adjustments) (Table 2.14).

In the eastern and central regions the

urban-rural gap was moderate in 2002 but increased substantially between 2002 and
2007.
Table 2.14 about here
In large metropolitan cities the urban-rural income gap shrank between 2002 and
2007, so that by 2007 the large metropolitan cities had the smallest urban-rural
income ratio, although it still remained at 2.0.15 This decline may reflect the
development of rural districts in the large metropolitan cities and their increased urban
integration.
Based on the above regional analysis, we conclude that income differences
between the eastern, central, and western regions are not a major source of nationwide
inequality.

Within-region income differences are much more important, although
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less so in the large metropolitan cities than in the eastern, central, and western regions.
Urban-rural inequality appears to be a contributing factor to the rising inequality in
the latter three regions.

VIII. Poverty
During the reform era China has achieved dramatic and ongoing reductions in poverty.
By 2002 the poverty rate was already quite low, and further poverty reduction became
more challenging due to several factors, for example, the fact that a high proportion of
the remaining poverty was geographically dispersed and transient, and also because
poverty had become less responsive to macroeconomic growth (World Bank 2009a).
Policies adopted after 2002, such as the minimum living guarantee program, the new
rural cooperative medical system, and the new rural pension system, have addressed
some of these factors.
Here we examine trends in poverty between 2002 and 2007 so as to understand
the net effects of policies and growth on poverty. Studies of poverty have used
different poverty lines and poverty measures.

We present three alternative estimates

of poverty, two using absolute poverty lines and one using a relative poverty line.
For all estimates we use the NBS definition of income, which does not include
imputed rents on owner-occupied housing. We exclude imputed rents because the
poverty lines are set without reference to imputed rents.
The first absolute poverty line is the international PPP poverty threshold of $1.25
per day per person, which we convert to yuan using the PPP exchange rate of 3.46
yuan to the US dollar in 2005 (Chen and Ravallion 2008).

The second absolute

poverty line is the Chinese government’s official poverty line for rural areas.

In

view of past criticisms that the Chinese official poverty line is too low, we use the new,
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higher 2008 official poverty line of 1196 yuan. We treat both of these poverty lines
as rural poverty lines and convert them to 2002 and 2007 prices using the NBS
consumer price index for rural areas.

We set the urban absolute poverty lines equal

to the rural poverty lines adjusted by the urban-rural cost of living differential (taken
from Brandt and Holz [2006], and for 2007 updated using the NBS consumer prices
indexes).
Relative poverty lines are used fairly often, especially in higher-income countries
where few households experience absolute deprivation but where individuals at the
lower end of the income distribution are nevertheless disadvantaged (Osberg 2000;
Ravallion 1992).

In view of the substantial growth in personal incomes in China in

recent decades, the concept of relative poverty has become increasingly relevant.
Following common practice in the literature, we use a relative poverty line equal to 50
percent of the median income.

The relative poverty lines are set at 50 percent of the

median income in each of the rural and urban sectors, with long-term, stable migrants
included in the urban sector.

Table 2.15 shows our poverty lines expressed in current

prices for each year.
Table 2.15 about here
We note that Chapters 5 and 7 in this volume provide more detailed, separate
analyses of poverty in the rural and urban sectors.

Due to differences in calculation,

in some cases the levels of poverty reported in these chapters may differ from those
reported here; however, the overall trends between 2002 and 2007 are similar.
Our estimates of poverty incidence appear on the top half of Table 2.16. For
China as a whole, absolute poverty declined quite substantially between 2002 and
2007.

Using the PPP $1.25 poverty line, for example, the poverty rate fell from 19

percent to 8 percent.

Underlying this reduction is a marked decline in rural poverty.
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Absolute poverty in the formal urban and migrant populations also declined, but was
already low in 2002.
Table 2.16 about here
In contrast, the rate of relative poverty in China as a whole remained more or less
unchanged at 13 percent.

Stagnant relative poverty rates suggest that households at

the lower tail of the income distribution were not catching up to the median.

This is

consistent with our finding of increased inequality, as discussed above. Relative
poverty rates are fairly similar for the rural and urban areas, except for migrants
within the urban areas. For this group, relative poverty was higher in 2002, but by
2007 it had declined and was below the relative poverty rates for the rural and formal
urban populations.
For all poverty lines, the overwhelming majority of the poor were rural (as shown
in the bottom half of Table 2.16). Using absolute poverty measures, more than 95
percent of the poor were rural.

Using the relative poverty measure, the share of the

rural poor is lower, although still high at 60+ percent.

Since the urban relative

poverty lines are equal to 50 percent of the median urban income, and thus higher
than the rural relative poverty lines, it is not surprising that by this measure a greater
proportion of the relative poor than the absolute poor are located in the cities.
Moreover, the share of the relative poor located in the cities increased noticeably
between 2002 and 2007.
Poverty rates differed greatly among regions. As shown in Table 2.17, the
incidence of absolute poverty in the large municipalities was extremely low; in the
eastern region it was also relatively low, especially in 2007. The incidence of
absolute poverty was higher in the central region and highest in the western region,
although in both places it declined substantially between 2002 and 2007.
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In the

western region the rate of absolute poverty, measured using PPP$1.25 per day,
declined from 32 percent to 15 percent.
Table 2.17 about here
Relative poverty was very low in the large municipalities, somewhat low in the
eastern region, moderate in the central region, and highest in the western region,
where more than 20 percent of the population fell below the relative poverty line.
Relative poverty nationwide and in all regions was fairly stable between 2002 and
2007.

Note that we use the same relative poverty line (50 percent of national median

income) for all regions.
By all measures, China’s poor are heavily concentrated in the West.

As shown

on the bottom half of Table 2.17, half of China’s absolute poor and well over 40
percent of the relative poor live in the western region.

Moreover, from 2002 to 2007

the western region’s share of the poor increased. Less than 1 percent of China’s poor
live in the large municipalities; 15 to 20 percent live in the eastern region; and about a
one-third live in the central region. This regional structure suggests the need for
focused attention on poverty alleviation in the western and central regions.
We note further that within all regions poverty was largely rural.

For example,

in 2007 in all regions, including the western region, rates of absolute poverty
measured using $1.25 per day for formal urban residents and for long-term migrants
were all below 1 percent.
also below 1 percent.

In the large municipalities the rate of rural poverty was

In contrast, in the eastern, central, and western regions the

rates of rural poverty were 7, 12, and 22 percent, respectively. Again, this pattern
has implications for the design of poverty alleviation programs.

IX. Conclusions
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Despite official policies emphasizing shared growth during the Hu Jintao-Wen Jiabao
period, between 2002 and 2007 income inequality in China resumed its upward
trajectory. By 2007 the level of inequality in China was moderately high by
international standards.

With a Gini of approximately 0.5, China was in the same

ballpark as countries in South and Central America such as Mexico (0.51), Nicaragua
(0.52), and Peru (0.48), although the level of inequality was still below that of the
high-inequality countries such as Brazil and Honduras (0.56-0.57).16
Our analysis reveals some old and some new factors that have contributed to this
increase in inequality. An old factor is China’s already large urban-rural income gap.
The urban-rural gap widened further between 2002 and 2007. Even after adjusting
for differences in costs of living, the difference between urban and rural incomes was
very high by international standards and contributed a substantial share of national
inequality.
A new factor contributing to the rising inequality was income from property and
assets.

By 2007, with the completion of urban housing privatization and the

development of urban residential real-estate markets, expansion of stock and capital
markets, growth of private enterprises, and other property rights reforms, income from
property and assets was beginning to be important.

We find that in 2007 asset and

property income contributed to both the urban-rural income gap and to the overall
inequality. In the future, the importance of asset and property income is likely to
grow and may continue to drive up inequality in China.

Inequality in these sources

of income is potentially a hot-button issue, as in China the institutions that shape the
distribution of assets are not yet transparent or equitable.
We find evidence that some equalizing factors have also been at work.
Although they did not fully offset the dis-equalizing factors, they nevertheless
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moderated the upward trend.
equalizing impact.

In 2007 urban net transfers began to have a modestly

This category of income includes public transfers, thereby

suggesting that the expansion of urban social welfare programs has played a positive
role.

Rapid growth in rural incomes, even if not as rapid as urban income growth,

also moderated inequality.

From the perspective of inequality, growth in rural

incomes from farming and short-term migration was especially important.

Some

dimensions of regional inequality narrowed, for example, between-region rural
inequality.

These findings suggest that farm support and regional development

programs may have moderated income disparities, especially in rural China.
We note that our estimates likely understate the real trends in inequality because
high-income urban households are increasingly underrepresented in the NBS urban
survey sample and also because the income of high-income households is likely
understated.

These are common problems in household surveys in general.

The

problem is relatively recent in China, and future sampling methods and analytical
approaches will need to adapt.

A preliminary study by Li and Luo (2011) indicates

that adjustments to correct for the undercounting of income of high-income urban
households would increase the Gini coefficient by 8 percentage points in urban areas
and by 5 percentage points nationwide.
Between 2002 and 2007 China achieved major gains in poverty reduction.
Despite new challenges in poverty alleviation, during this period absolute poverty
continued its downward trend.

Relative poverty, however, did not decline, indicating

that households at the bottom of the income distribution were not catching up with
those at the middle or the top.

As China’s economy matures and the number of

absolute poor shrinks, relative poverty will become an increasingly important social
indicator.
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In summary, then, we find that although households in all income groups, sectors,
and regions continued to enjoy substantial income growth during this period, income
growth was faster for richer households than for poorer households. The resulting
increase in inequality reflected shifts in the structure of the income distribution and
the emergence of some new underlying mechanisms.

China thus faces ongoing

challenges in its efforts to promote growth with equity.
distributional policies will need to evolve accordingly.
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In the future, China’s
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Appendix
Table 2A.1. Income and inequality with alternative weights, 2002 and 2007
2002

2007

urban

rural

national
(excluding
migrants)

Mean income
Gini

8504
0.325

2773
0.364

4791
0.454

6180
0.349

GE(0)/MLD
GE(1)

0.176
0.180

0.225
0.238

0.360
0.355

0.214
0.212

Mean income
Gini
GE(0)/MLD
GE(1)

8504
0.325
0.176
0.180

2773
0.364
0.225
0.238

4740
0.455
0.360
0.356

Mean income
Gini
GE(0)/MLD
GE(1)

8800
0.326
0.177
0.180

2815
0.365
0.227
0.239

4862
0.458
0.366
0.362

Mean income
Gini
GE(0)/MLD
GE(1)

9002
0.331
0.182
0.186

2771
0.354
0.213
0.226

4958
0.462
0.370
0.370

migrant

national
(including
migrants)
No weights
4858
0.450

urban

rural

national
(excluding
migrants)

17527
0.340

5106
0.377

9587
0.480

16048
0.308

9982
0.475

0.239
0.250

0.407
0.397

0.163
0.173

0.400
0.385

5106
0.377
0.239
0.250

10322
0.476
0.405
0.386

16048
0.308
0.163
0.173

10501
0.472
0.400
0.380

4659
0.367
0.227
0.236

9746
0.479
0.411
0.394

16785
0.295
0.149
0.159

9966
0.476
0.408
0.388

4617
0.358
0.216
0.226

10072
0.487
0.424
0.409

16673
0.289
0.144
0.154

10277
0.483
0.420
0.401

0.355
0.193
0.348
0.196
Weight I (urban/rural)
6180
4776
17527
0.349
0.453
0.340
0.214
0.357
0.193
0.212
0.352
0.196
Weight II (urban/rural x region)
6691
4907
16805
0.343
0.456
0.337
0.206
0.364
0.190
0.203
0.358
0.196
Weight III (urban/rural x province x region)
7167
4902
17639
0.336
0.460
0.340
0.200
0.368
0.193
0.193
0.366
0.199

Notes:
1. Includes all provinces covered by the CHIP. Calculated using current year prices and CHIP income.
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migrant

national
(including
migrants)

2. The inequality indexes shown in this table are all scale-invariant. Consequently, the level of inequality is the same for both the current
year and constant prices (if deflation is carried out using the same price index for all individuals).
3. Incomes less than or equal to zero have been dropped for calculation of the GE(0)/MLD and GE(1) inequality indexes (fewer than 30
observations [individuals] were dropped in 2002 and fewer than 225 in 2007).
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Table 2A.2. Income and inequality with alternative estimates of imputed rental income
on owner-occupied housing, 2002 and 2007
2002
2007
A
B
A
B
Mean value of urban imputed
rents on owner-occupied housing 558
860
1945 3229
Mean value of urban income per
capita
9002 9303 17638 18922
Urban-rural income ratio
3.25 3.36
3.82
4.10
Inequality within urban areas (migrants excluded)
Gini
0.331 0.327 0.340 0.337
G(0)
0.182 0.178 0.193 0.190
G(1)
0.186 0.182 0.199 0.197
National inequality (migrants included)
Gini
0.460 0.464 0.483 0.492
G(0)
0.368 0.375 0.420 0.440
G(1)
0.366 0.372 0.401 0.416
Notes:
1. Column A contains estimates that use the rate of return approach to calculate rural
imputed rents and the market rent approach to calculate urban imputed rents.
Estimates reported elsewhere in this chapter follow this approach. Column B
contains alternative estimates that use the rate of return approach for both rural and
urban areas. See Chapter 3 for a detailed discussion of the two approaches.
2. Three-level weights, CHIP income, and current prices are used in all calculations.
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Table 2A.3. Mean income per capita by region, 2002 and 2007 (yuan)
PPP unadjusted
2002
2007
Region
urban rural migrant
all
urban rural migrant
all
Large municipalities 17022 5267 8206 13902 27780 11436 19930 24143
Eastern
10155 3869 8052
6402 21909 6233 17653 13994
Central
6790 2391 5206
3781 13790 4140 12202 7971
Western
7390 1955 5881
3450 13113 3426 14335 6814
PPP adjusted
2002
2007
Region
urban rural migrant
all
urban rural migrant
all
Large municipalities 9577 3477 4617
7930 16876 8103 12161 14867
Eastern
6836 4076 4986
5153 15278 6418 11701 10742
Central
5535 2640 4230
3552 11063 4380
9824
7031
Western
6129 2039 4853
3162 10707 3630 11648 6106
Notes: In this table long-term stable migrants are shown separately, and urban
excludes migrants. CHIP income definition; calculated using weights (three-level
weights for all, provincial and regional weights for urban, rural, and migrant); currentyear prices. See notes to Table 2.3 regarding PPP adjustments.
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Figure 2.1 China’s National Lorenz Curves for Household Per Capita Income, 2002
and 2007 (three-level weights, including migrants, CHIP income definition)
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Note: Includes all provinces in both years, CHIP income definition, weighted by
province, region, and urban/rural. Calculated using incomes in current-year prices.
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1

Figure 2.2 Income Levels and Growth by Deciles, 2002 to 2007
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2007 (constant prices) 1284 2239 2997 3847 5012 6674 8982 119351650330792
% change

45.4 56.7 60.3 64.0 72.7 82.7 89.4 87.2 87.2 85.8

Note: Includes all provinces covered by the CHIP surveys, CHIP income definition,
three-level weights (province, region, and urban/rural). Calculated using incomes in
constant 2002 prices.
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0

Figure 2.3 Lorenz Curve of Migrant Per Capita Income, 2002 and 2007
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Note: Includes all provinces covered by the migrant surveys, CHIP income
definition, weighted by province and region using population shares of long-term,
stable migrants (see Appendix II in this volume). Calculated using incomes in
current-year prices.

130

Table 2.1. National mean income and inequality, 2002 and 2007

Mean income
Gini
GE(0)
GE(1)
Mean income
Gini
GE(0)
GE(1)

% change,
2002 to 2007,
2002
2007
constant 2002 prices
Excluding Including Excluding Including Excluding Including
migrants
migrants migrants
migrants migrants
migrants
NBS income
75.61
77.69
4467
4530
8932
9165
5.48
5.05
0.456
0.455
0.481
0.478
14.36
14.40
0.362
0.361
0.414
0.413
10.56
10.11
0.360
0.356
0.398
0.392
CHIP income
4958
0.462
0.370
0.370

4902
0.460
0.368
0.366

10072
0.487
0.424
0.409

10277
0.483
0.420
0.401

78.42
5.41
14.59
10.54

84.13
5.00
14.13
9.56

Notes:
1. All estimates are calculated using three-level weights, i.e., urban/rural x
regional x provincial population shares.
2. Estimates are calculated using data from all provinces covered by the CHIP
surveys.
3. Mean incomes for each year are calculated using current-year prices, and the
change between 2002 and 2007 is calculated using constant 2002 prices
(deflated using the national average consumer price index).
4. The inequality indexes shown in this table are all scale-invariant.
Consequently, the level of inequality is the same for both the current year
and constant prices (if deflation is carried out using the same price index for
all individuals).
5. Here and elsewhere, incomes less than or equal to zero have been dropped
for calculation of the GE(0) and GE(1) inequality indexes. In all, fewer
than 30 observations (individuals) were dropped in 2002 and fewer than 225
in 2007.
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Table 2.2. Decomposition of inequality by income sources, 2002 and 2007
2002
2007
Contribution
Contribution
Concentration
to total
Concentration
to total
ratio or Gini Share
inequality
ratio or Gini Share inequality
(%)
(%)
(%)
(%)
Rural total
0.011
35.87
0.89
-0.101
25.30
-5.30
Wages from migrant
jobs
-0.066
4.07
-0.59
-0.185
4.47
-1.71
Other wages
0.156
8.77
2.97
-0.017
5.09
-0.18
Net farm
-0.129
14.23
-3.98
-0.191
9.24
-3.65
Net from non-farm
activities
0.206
4.69
2.10
0.126
2.58
0.67
Assets
0.410
0.24
0.22
0.185
0.66
0.25
Net transfers
0.071
1.51
0.23
-0.089
1.08
-0.20
Imputed rent on
owner-occupied
housing
-0.013
2.35
-0.06
-0.108
2.17
-0.49
Urban total
0.717
60.56
94.32
0.684
69.65
98.49
Wages
0.717
42.19
65.74
0.679
45.78
64.36
Pensions
0.718
9.89
15.42
0.664
12.58
17.28
Net from individual
businesses
0.583
2.01
2.55
0.687
5.39
7.66
Assets
0.783
0.72
1.23
0.875
1.09
1.98
Net transfers
0.678
-0.39
-0.57
0.697
-3.75
-5.41
In-kind subsidies on
public rental housing
0.742
1.68
2.70
0.645
0.41
0.55
Imputed rent on
owner-occupied
housing
0.739
3.76
6.03
0.714
7.68
11.34
Other in-kind income
0.808
0.70
1.22
0.778
0.46
0.74
Migrants total
0.618
3.57
4.79
0.652
5.05
6.81
Wages
0.554
1.38
1.66
0.626
3.42
4.43
Net from individual
businesses
0.652
2.02
2.86
0.695
1.50
2.16
Assets
0.413
0.01
0.01
0.886
0.03
0.05
Net transfers
0.719
0.09
0.14
0.885
0.02
0.04
Imputed rent on
owner-occupied
housing
0.763
0.08
0.13
0.796
0.08
0.13
National total
100
100
100
100
0.460
0.483
Note: CHIP income definition, including migrants, using three-level weights.
Includes all provinces covered by the CHIP surveys. Calculated using incomes
measured in current-year prices.
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Table 2.3. Inequality estimates with and without PPP adjustments, 2002 and 2007
% change, 2002 to
2002
2007
2007
Without
With
Without
With
Without
With
PPP
PPP
PPP
PPP
PPP
PPP
NBS income
Gini
0.455
0.389
0.478
0.421
5.1
8.2
GE(0)/MLD
0.361
0.265
0.413
0.315
14.4
18.9
GE(1)
0.356
0.258
0.392
0.302
10.1
17.1
CHIP income
5.00
8.18
Gini
0.391
0.423
0.460
0.483
14.13
19.62
GE(0)/MLD
0.265
0.317
0.368
0.420
9.56
17.76
GE(1)
0.259
0.305
0.366
0.401
Notes:
1. Includes all provinces covered by the CHIP surveys.
2. Calculated using three-level weights and including migrants. Incomes are
in current-year prices.
3. For PPP estimates, incomes have been adjusted for differences in cost of
living between urban and rural areas and among provinces using the Brandt
and Holz (2006) geographic price indexes for 2002 and updated to 2007
using the provincial rural and urban price indexes published by the NBS.
4. Incomes less than or equal to zero have been dropped for calculation of the
GE(0)/MLD and GE(1) inequality indexes. See notes to Table 2.1.
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Table 2.4. Level and growth of migrant household per capita income
Annual income growth
2002
2007
(constant 2002 prices)
Wage income
2768
11294
29.4%
Individual business net
income
4050
4953
1.7%
Asset income
13
99
47.3%
Net transfer income
177
75
-17.7%
Imputed rent on
owner-occupied housing
159
252
7.1%
7167
16673
15.7%
Total income
Note: Includes all provinces covered by the migrant surveys, CHIP income
definition, weighted by province and region using population shares of long-term
stable migrants (see Appendix II to this volume). In current-year prices except for
the real growth rates, which are deflated using the urban consumer price index.
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Table 2.5. Migrant inequality, 2002 and 2007
% change,
2002 to 2007
Gini
-14.0%
0.336
0.289
GE(0)/MLD
-28.0%
0.200
0.144
GE(1)
-20.2%
0.193
0.154
Note: Includes all provinces covered by the migrant surveys, CHIP income
definition, weighted by province and region using population shares of long-term
stable migrants (see Appendix II to this volume). Calculated using current-year
prices, but the level of inequality is the same for the current year and constant prices if
deflation is carried out using the same consumer price index for all individuals.
2002

2007
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Table 2.6. Decomposition of migrant income inequality by income source, 2002 and
2007
2002
2007
ContribuContribuConcentra
tion to total Concentration to total
-tion ratio
Share
inequality
tion ratio
Share
inequality
or Gini
(%)
(%)
or Gini
(%)
(%)
Wage income
0.219
38.63
25.2
0.224
67.74
52.5
Individual
business net
income
0.398
56.5
66.9
0.404
29.71
41.5
Asset income
0.014
0.18
0.0
0.797
0.59
1.6
Net transfer
income
0.537
2.48
4.0
0.805
0.45
1.3
Imputed rent on
owner-occupied
housing
0.597
2.21
3.9
0.590
1.51
3.1
Total income
0.336
100
100
0.289
100
100
Note: Includes all provinces covered by the migrant surveys, CHIP income
definition, weighted by province and region using population shares of long-term
stable migrants (see Appendix II to this volume). Calculated using incomes in
current-year prices; the level of inequality is the same for the current year and
constant prices if deflation is carried out using the same consumer price index for all
individuals.

136

Table 2.7. Urban inequality with and without migrants, 2002 and 2007
2002
2007
Without
With
Without
With
Gini
0.331
0.305
0.340
0.317
GE(0)/MLD
0.182
0.156
0.193
0.169
GE(1)
0.186
0.157
0.199
0.174
Note: Includes all provinces covered by the surveys in both years, CHIP income
definition, weighted by province and region using the population shares of urban
locals and long-term stable migrants (see Appendix II to this volume). Calculated
using incomes in current-year prices.
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Table 2.8. The urban-rural income gap, 2002 and 2007
Average
Urban-rural
Mean
annual
income ratio
income per
income
Urban-rural
(PPP
capita (yuan)
growth
income ratio
adjusted)
(constant
2002 2007 2002 prices) 2002
2007
2002 2007
NBS income
Urban, without
migrants
8078 15469
11.26%
3.16
3.66
2.13
2.61
Urban, with
migrants
8005 15537
11.56%
3.13
3.68
2.10
2.60
Rural
2590 4221
6.96%
CHIP income
Urban, without
migrants
11.77%
2.21
2.71
9002 17639
3.25
3.82
Urban, with
migrants
8875 17570
12.00%
2.17
2.68
3.20
3.80
Rural
7.44%
2771 4618
Note: Unadjusted current-year prices unless noted otherwise. Includes all
provinces covered in the CHIP surveys; calculated using regional and provincial
population weights. PPP estimates are calculated using incomes that have been
adjusted for differences in cost of living between urban and rural areas and among
provinces using the Brandt and Holz (2006) geographic price indexes for 2002, and
updated to 2007 using the provincial rural and urban price indexes published by the
NBS.
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Table 2.9. Contribution of urban-rural (between-group) inequality to national
inequality (%)
NBS income definition CHIP income definition
2002
2007
2002
2007
Without migrants
GE(0)
43.1
49.3
45.6
52.0
GE(1)
44.0
48.0
46.3
50.7
With migrants
GE(0)
42.9
49.6
44.5
50.9
GE(1)
43.5
48.1
44.5
48.5
Note: Calculations with migrants include in the urban sector long-term, stable
migrants from the rural areas in the urban sector. Three-level weights are used.
Calculated using incomes measured in current-year prices. See Shorrocks (1980) for a
discussion of the decomposition methodology.
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Table 2.10. Contributions of urban-rural (between-group) inequality to national
inequality, with PPP adjustments (%)
NBS income definition CHIP income definition
2002
2007
2002
2007
Without migrants
28.3
38.6
GE(0)
25.7
35.4
29.9
39.0
GE(1)
27.2
35.9
With migrants
27.1
37.5
GE(0)
25.2
35.6
28.4
37.3
GE(1)
26.6
35.8
Note: The note to Table 2.9 applies. PPP adjustments for 2002 use the Brandt and
Holz (2006) price deflators; for 2007 the Brandt and Holz (2006) deflators are
updated using the NBS provincial urban and rural consumer price indexes.
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Table 2.11. Regional income gaps, 2002 and 2007
PPP unadjusted
2002
2007
Region
urban rural migrant all urban rural migrant all
Large municipalities 2.30
2.69
1.40
4.03
2.12
3.34
1.39
3.54
Eastern
1.37
1.98
1.37
1.86
1.67
1.82
1.23
2.05
Central
0.92
1.22
0.89
1.10
1.05
1.21
0.85
1.17
Western
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
PPP adjusted
2002
2007
Region
urban rural migrant all urban rural migrant all
Large municipalities 1.56
1.70
0.95
2.51
1.58
2.23
1.04
2.43
Eastern
1.12
2.00
1.03
1.63
1.43
1.77
1.00
1.76
Central
0.90
1.29
0.87
1.12
1.03
1.21
0.84
1.15
Western
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
Note: Income gaps are equal to the ratio of each region’s income per capita to that in
the western region. In this table long-term stable migrants are shown separately, and
urban excludes migrants. CHIP income definition; calculated using three-level
weights for all and regional x provincial weights for the urban, rural, and migrant
subgroups; current-year prices. See notes to previous tables regarding PPP
adjustments.
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Table 2.12. Contributions of between-region inequality to overall inequality (%)
PPP unadjusted
2002
2007
urban rural
migrant
all
urban rural
migrant
all
7.3
15.5
GE(0)
19.4
20.7
7.8
17.6
18.0
16.9
6.5
17.1
GE(1)
20.5
20.0
7.6
19.9
17.6
17.2
PPP adjusted
2002
2007
urban rural
migrant
all
urban rural migrant
all
1.3
11.3
GE(0)
6.9
19.1
1.0
11.6
9.1
13.5
1.1
12.1
GE(1)
7.2
18.6
1.0
12.5
8.9
13.6
Note: The contributions of the differences in mean incomes among the four regions to
national inequality are shown in the column titled “all.” The other columns report
the contributions of income differences between the four regions to inequality within
the urban, rural, and migrant subgroups. CHIP income definition; calculated using
three-level weights for all and regional x provincial weights for the urban, rural and
migrant subgroups; current-year prices.
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Table 2.13. Gini coefficients by region, 2002 and 2007
PPP unadjusted
2002
2007
Large municipalities
0.321
0.315
Eastern
0.418
0.456
Central
0.398
0.428
Western
0.456
0.471
PPP adjusted
2002
2007
Large municipalities
0.311
0.307
Eastern
0.352
0.400
Central
0.346
0.381
Western
0.422
0.421
Note: CHIP income definition; incomes are in current-year prices. Calculated using
provincial and rural/urban weights. Long-term, stable migrants are included in these
calculations.
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Table 2.14. The urban-rural income gap by region, 2002 and 2007
PPP unadjusted
2002
2007
3.08
2.34
Large municipalities
2.58
3.44
Eastern
2.81
3.32
Central
3.73
3.85
Western
PPP adjusted
2002
2007
2.62
2.00
Large municipalities
1.64
2.32
Eastern
2.08
2.52
Central
2.97
2.96
Western
Note: See notes to Table 2.13 and notes to previous tables regarding PPP adjustments.
CHIP income definition. Migrants are included as urban residents in the calculations.
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Table 2.15. Poverty lines
official
2002 2007
964 1123
1338 1503

PPP$1.25/day
2002 2007
1451 1689
2013 2260

50% of
median income
2002
2007
1051
1714
3379
6412

Rural
Urban & migrants
Note:
1. The international PPP poverty threshold of $1.25 per day per person is
converted to yuan using the PPP exchange rate of 3.46 yuan to the US dollar
in 2005 (Chen and Ravallion 2008).
2. We treat both the official poverty line and the PPP $1.25/day poverty line as
rural poverty lines and convert them to 2002 and 2007 prices using the NBS
rural consumer price index. Urban absolute poverty lines are equal to the
rural poverty lines adjusted by the urban-rural cost of living differential of
1.3876 in 2002 and 1.3382 in 2007 (taken from Brandt and Holz [2006], and
for 2007 updated using NBS consumer price indexes).
3. The relative poverty lines are calculated separately for urban and rural.
Median incomes for rural and urban (including migrants) are calculated
using regional x provincial weights and the NBS income definition.
4. All poverty lines are in current-year prices.
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Table 2.16. Poverty incidence and composition, 2002 and 2007 (%)
Official
50% of median
poverty line
PPP$1.25/day
income
2002
2007
2002
2007
2002
2007
Poverty incidence
Rural
11.22
5.59
27.49
13.88
13.69
14.32
Urban
0.55
0.12
2.34
0.44
11.88
12.37
Migrants
2.43
0.08
5.80
0.17
18.57
7.00
urban+migrants
0.68
0.12
2.58
0.42
12.34
11.98
Total
7.44
3.20
18.57
8.00
13.21
13.30
Poverty composition
Rural
96.72
98.35
95.02
97.70
66.52
60.63
Urban
2.48
1.57
4.21
2.23
30.01
37.73
Migrants
0.80
0.08
0.77
0.07
3.47
1.64
urban+migrants
3.28
1.65
4.98
2.30
33.48
39.37
Total
100
100
100
100
100
100
Note: Calculated using three-level weights for total and regional x provincial
weights for subgroups. NBS income definition; current year prices.
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Table 2.17. The structure of poverty by region (%)
Official poverty line
PPP$1.25/day
2002
2007
2002
2007
Poverty incidences
Large municipalities
0.07
0.09
0.70
0.35
Eastern
3.77
1.59
8.80
3.74
Central
6.98
2.74
19.87
7.47
Western
13.53
6.07
31.64
14.77
Total
7.44
3.20
18.57
8.00
Poverty composition
Large municipalities
0.03
0.09
0.12
0.14
Eastern
18.33
17.59
17.16
16.51
Central
30.42
28.41
34.71
30.94
Western
51.22
53.91
48.00
52.40
Total
100
100
100
100

50% of median income
2002
2007
0.89
7.73
14.21
20.49
13.21

1.87
7.78
12.81
21.99
13.30

0.21
21.19
34.91
43.69
100

0.44
20.65
31.94
46.96
100

Note: Calculated using three-level weights for total and regional x provincial weights
for subgroups. NBS income definition; current year prices. A single relative
poverty line calculated as 50 percent of the national median income is used for all
regions.
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1

These statistics are based on data published by the NBS. As discussed below, the
NBS statistics yield somewhat different rates of growth in household income than the
CHIP data. According to the NBS data, household per capita income in real terms
increased 7.34 times for rural households and 7.53 times for urban households during
the 1978-2007 period (National Bureau of Statistics 2008b).
2

The total amount of agricultural subsidy funds, including grain subsidies, reached
52.6 billion yuan in 2007; see “Nongyebu: Guojia jiang baochi zhi nonghui nong
zhengce de wendingxing lianxuxing” (Ministry of Agriculture: The State Will
Maintain Stable and Continuous Policy Support for Agriculture), September 13, 2007,
at http://www.china.com.cn/news/2007-09/13/content_8869413.htm (accessed August
22, 2011).
3

See the introduction to the sampling procedure for the NBS household survey in
2002 (NBS 2003, pp. 339-340).
4

See the introduction to the sampling procedure for the NBS household survey in
2007 (NBS 2008a, pp. 313-314).
5

Note that Chongqing did not become a provincial-level municipality until 1997 and
it is markedly less urbanized and less economically developed than China’s other
provincial-level municipalities (Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin). Therefore, in this and
other chapters, Chongqing is included as part of the western region.
6

The geographic areas used to construct the CHIP sample frame are (1) large
municipalities with provincial status (Beijing, Tianjin, and Shanghai, treated together
as a separate geographic area [Chongqing is treated as part of Sichuan in western
China for consistency with earlier rounds of the survey]), (2) eastern China (Hebei,
Liaoning, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Fujian, Shandong, Guangdong, and Hainan); central
China (Shanxi, Jilin, Heilongjiang, Anhui, Jiangxi, Henan, Hubei, and Hunan); and
western China (Inner Mongolia, Guangxi, Chongqing, Sichuan, Guizhou, Yunnan,
Tibet, Shaanxi, Gansu, Qinghai, Ningxia, and Xinjiang).
7

Chapter 3 provides two alternative estimates of imputed rents, one in which all
imputed rents are calculated using the rate of return approach, and the other in which
urban imputed rents are calculated based on the market rent approach and rural
imputed rents are based on the rate of return approach. The former approach shows
higher urban incomes and more rapid growth in urban incomes as it is more sensitive
to housing price appreciation in urban China. In this chapter we use the latter
approach, which gives lower estimates of national inequality. Table 2A.2 provides
comparisons of the results calculated using the two approaches. See Chapter 3 for
additional discussion and comparisons between the two approaches.
8

See China Statistical Yearbook 2008, at
http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj/2008/indexch.htm, accessed August 22, 2011.
9

The Theil indices, like the Gini, have a minimum value of 0 and increase with
inequality. G(0), sometimes referred to as the Mean Log Deviation (MLD), is more
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sensitive to income differences at the low end of the income distribution. G(1),
sometimes referred to as the Theil index, places equal weight on income differences
across the income distribution. More information about the Theil measures of
inequality can be found in Cowell (2011) and at
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTPA/Resources/tn_measuring_inequality.pdf
and http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTPGI/Resources/Inequality/litchfie.pdf, both
accessed June 5, 2012.
10

The Lorenz curve is a plot of the percentage of total income in society accruing to
the bottom x percentage of the population. In the case of perfect equality (all members
of the population have equal income), the Lorenz curve is coincident with the 45
degree line. The farther the Lorenz curve is from the 45 degree line, the greater is the
inequality. In the case of perfect inequality (one person has all the income and
everyone else has zero income), the Lorenz curve is a right angle and coincides with
the axis. The Gini is calculated as the ratio of the area between the Lorenz curve and
the 45 degree line to the total area under the 45 degree line. The minimum value of
the Gini is zero, which occurs when there is perfect equality, and the maximum value
is one, which occurs when there is perfect inequality. In practice the Gini for most
countries generally falls between 0.2 and 0.7. See Cowell (2011) for a fuller
discussion of inequality measurement.
11

The alternative estimates are calculated as the rate of return times the estimated
market value of housing. This yields values of imputed rents that are higher and that
increased more rapidly than the base estimates, which are calculated using estimated
market rents. The alternative estimates give higher contributions of urban imputed
rents to overall inequality: 8.80 percent in 2002 and 17.45 percent in 2007. See
Chapter 3 for further discussion.

12

If the share of each income component had remained the same in 2002 and 2007,
the inequality of total migrant income would have increased by 4 percent. The
analysis in Chapter 6 in this volume, however, suggests that some of the change in the
structure of migrant income was likely due to real economic factors, not merely a
sample bias.
13

The Gini coefficient is not decomposable by population subgroup.

14

We also carried out the decomposition using alternative weights. The results are
similar, so we do not report them here.

15

Urban administrative areas in China often include not only urbanized districts but
also farmland and rural populations, following the Mao-era practice of incorporating
surrounding rural areas into city administration. See Chan (2010).
16

The Gini coefficients for the other countries reported here are for 2005 and are
measured over household income per capita. They are from the UNU-WIDER
WIID2c database, at http://www.wider.unu.edu/research/Database/en_GB/wiid/ ,
accessed August 12, 2011. Note that the Ginis for Brazil and Honduras are the
highest among all countries listed in this database for 2005-2006.
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